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The governance of food markets is a crucial element for efficiency and distributional effects.  
In this paper, we use a conceptual model to show that this governance itself is endogenous in 
an environment of weak contract enforcement and imperfect markets, and importantly 
depends on the value in the chain.  We relate the predictions of the theory to empirical 
evidence on differences in supply chain governance in Africa across different commodity 
types.  In doing so we offer an explanation as why private sector governance systems with 
interlinked market transactions have emerged for higher value crops but not for staple food 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent policy discussions have emphasized the importance of the staple food crop sector in 
Sub Sahara Africa to increase farm productivity, to achieve food security and to alleviate 
poverty (see for example the Summit on Food Security in Africa in Abuja, Nigeria in 
December 2006). A crucial issue in the debate is how the staples food sector can generate 
surpluses and how to ensure an equitable distribution of these surpluses.  
In this paper we argue that the governance of food markets and commodity chains is a 
crucial element for efficiency and distributional effects -- including for growth and food 
security – and that the chain governance itself is endogenous in an environment of weak 
contract enforcement and imperfect markets, and importantly depends on the value in the 
chain (and on other commodity characteristics).  Supply chain governance – or the way 
economic transactions in supply chains are coordinated (Gereffi et al., 2005) – is crucial in 
determining how economic surpluses are generated and distributed along the chain. There is 
large variation in how food and agricultural commodity chains are governed, with the 
involvement of the public sector and/or different private agents and varying levels of vertical 
coordination between those actors. It has been argued and empirically demonstrated that the 
degree of vertical coordination in supply chains indeed influences economic outcomes, in 
particular efficiency and equity (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007).  
To show how the value in the chain determines the governance of the chain and how 
surpluses are distributed along the value chain we use a conceptual model, based on the 
theory developed more formally in Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007).  We then compare the 
predictions of the theory with empirical evidence on governance of different commodity 
  3chains in Africa.  In combination, this allows to understanding the constraints on growth in 
staple food chains and to identify policy implications. 
Our approach involves several key aspects.  First, we develop a general model of 
value chains to allow comparisons across different commodity types. To understand what is 
(not) occurring in the staples food sectors we think it is essential to not focus merely on the 
staple food crop sector but to relate and compare its characteristics and economic 
performance to other agricultural subsectors. For this purpose we use a simple classification 
of low, medium and high-value commodities. This simple classification could be thought of 
as representing the three types of agricultural markets identified by Poulton et al (2006)
1: 
staple food crops, traditional exports, and non-traditional exports.  In sub-Sahara Africa 
(SSA), these three markets represent specific commodities, such as grains (staples food 
crops); coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, and tobacco (traditional export crops); and fresh and 
processed fruits and vegetables (FFV) and fish and seafood products (FSP) (non-traditional 
export crops).  The non-traditional export crops, such as FFV, are often referred to as high-
value export commodities (e.g. Aksoy and Beghin, 2005) while the value of grains (per 
weight) is typically relatively low
2.  
Second, we explicitly use an “interlinking market” approach. The literature on supply 
chain governance (e.g. Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Swinnen 
and Maertens, 2006; Swinnen, 2005) often draws a distinction between market-based 
governance and contract-based governance
3.
4 However, from our perspective the key issue is 
                                                 
1 These authors draw heavily on the work of Diao et al. (2003).  
2 Also the perishability of produce varies along these commodity types with grains being least perishable and 
FFV and FSP the most delicate. 
3 Another form of supply chain governance is that of complete vertical integration, which occurs when activities 
at different stages of the chain are coordinated completely through ownership integration. This is an extreme 
form of governance that excludes smallholders from the production stage of the supply chain.  
4 The first typically occurs when produce is traded on a spot market basis with zero degree of coordination. The 
latter involves vertical coordination, which can take various forms and usually involves some form of 
contracting between traders (buyers) and farmers (suppliers). Contracts usually specify some form of price and 
outlet ex ante (sometimes referred to as marketing contracts). In addition contracts can include inputs, credit, 
  4not whether produce is supplied through spot markets or through contracts but whether 
transactions are made in one single market (the output market) or whether different economic 
transactions are interlinked
5. Interlinking
6 occurs when next to the exchange of primary 
produce, traders and suppliers agree on inputs, credit, extension, etc. to be delivered as part of 
the contract. We will show that the occurrence of interlinked market governance strongly 
depends on the commodity value and is positively related with efficiency and equity in 
agricultural supply chains.  
Third, we explicitly integrate two important aspects of the developing country 
institutional environment into the model: market imperfections and weak enforcement 
mechanisms. The functioning of markets (highly imperfect in many SSA countries) and the 
contract enforcement environment (often very weak in developing countries) play an 
important role in the emergence of specific systems of supply chain governance. These 
institutional aspects are therefore specifically accounted for. We will show that market 
imperfections and weak enforcement institutions are important in determining the distribution 
of surpluses in commodity value chains.     
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we describe the development of supply 
chain governance systems from a historical perspective. Second, we highlight the 
development of supply chain governance for different types of commodities. Third, we 
develop a conceptual model that theoretically describes how surpluses are distributed along 
the value chains depending on the emerging governance patterns and commodity value. 
Fourth, the theoretical outcomes of the model are confronted with observed patterns of 
                                                                                                                                                        
and extension services provided by the contractor, detailed production practices stipulated by the contractor, 
management decisions taken by the contractor, etc. (sometimes referred to as production contracts). 
5 The phenomenon of “interlinking markets” was first used in the development economics literature to describe 
a landlord-tenant relation where the landlord act as a financial intermediary between the outside loan market and 
his tenants. The landlord has better access to credit than his tenants while he can enforce credit repayment from 
his tenants through this dominant position in the land market (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). 
6 Bell (1988 p797) provides the following definition of interlinking: “an interlinked transaction is one in which 
the two parties trade in at least two markets on the condition that the terms of all such trades are jointly 
determined”  
  5governance and surplus distribution in different types of commodity chains.  Finally, we 
specify the policy implications of our findings.  
 
2.  A Historical Perspective on Supply Chain Governance 
State-controlled governance  
Most African countries were characterized by state-controlled supply chains for agricultural 
and food commodities in the decades after independence from colonial power
7. Governments 
heavily involved in agricultural marketing and food processing through the creation of 
marketing boards, (para-)state processing units, and government controlled cooperatives (e.g. 
in Tanzania). State-controlled governance was particularly common for basic food crops 
(most importantly grain) and important export crops such as coffee, cotton, and tea.  
State involvement in the production and marketing of staple food crops was most extreme 
in Eastern and Southern African countries while in West Africa, marketing boards and (para-
)state companies intervened heavily in the supply chains of export crops but were less 
influential in grain markets (Kherallah et al., 2002). Marketing of grain and other basic food 
crops was controlled by government marketing boards, e.g. in Malawi through ADMARC 
(Agricultural Development and Marketing Cooperation); in Zambia through NAMBOARD 
(National Agricultural Marketing Board); in Kenya through NCPB (National Cereals and 
Produce Board); etc. State governance in the processing and marketing of major export crops 
was done e.g. in the cotton sector in Cameroon (SODECOTON), Ghana (The Ghana Cotton 
Development Board), Kenya (Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board) and Malawi (Malawi 
Textile Development Company); the coffee sector in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia; the tea sector in Kenya (Kenyan Tea Development Cooperation); etc.  
                                                 
7 This was the case 25 years ago in many low income countries, not only in Africa. State control was most 
extreme in the Communist world, spreading from Central Asia to East Eurpo, but also in many Latin-American 
and South Asian countries the state played a very important role in the food chain.  
  6The dominant form of state governance in agro-food supply chains was that of seasonal 
input and credit provision to small farmers in return for supplies of primary produce. For 
example, the government marketing boards ADMARC in Malawi and NAMBOARD in 
Zambia provided seasonal inputs to peasant farmers deducting the value of the inputs from 
the payment made for marketed output at harvest time. Also parastatal cotton companies such 
as CMDT in Mali, SODECOTON in Cameroon and the Ghana Cotton Development Board 
provided credit and inputs to cotton farmers (Poulton et al., 1998). Hence, government 
marketing organization and parastatal processing companies dealt with farmers through 
interlinked transactions in output, input and credit markets. Also extension services were 
often part of these interlinked transactions. For example, the Ghana Cotton Development 
Board also provided extension services (Poulton, 1998) and the Kenyan Tea Development 
Cooperation was involved in effective control at all levels of the operation including planting 
material, production processes, quality control and extension services (Bauman, 2000). 
State control in agricultural supply systems was often motivated on political grounds and 
by the objective of extracting government revenues from the agricultural sector. Until the 
1980s there was a strong bias against agriculture in the policies of many SSA countries. 
Agricultural was viewed as a backward sector that could not take the lead in realizing 
economic growth. The emphasis was on food self-sufficiency and industrial export growth. 
Governments intervened in agricultural supply chains and markets basically to directly and 
indirectly tax agriculture, maximize foreign exchange earnings, and provide cheap food for 
urban consumers and industrial workers.    
The bias against agriculture in government policy has resulted in low agricultural 
growth rates. The system of state governance in agricultural supply chains led to a situations 
were government institutions were monopoly buyers of agricultural products (especially basic 
food crops and important export crops) and the only source of input and credit provisions for 
  7peasant farmers. Consequences for local farmers were very low agricultural prices and little 
production incentives. Moreover, marketing boards bore high costs of transport (due to pan-
territorial pricing policies) and of storage (due to pan-seasonal pricing policies). Marketing 
boards are often mentioned to have been highly inefficient due to corruption and bureaucracy 
which led to serious financial problems (Kherallah et al., 2002). Also late payments to 
farmers and very low credit repayment rates were in general characteristic of state 
governance systems. However, some studies also point at successful state supply chain 
governance. For example the contract-farming schemes of the Kenyan Tea Development 
Authority are referred to as a success story, which is attributed to its extensive form of 
interlinking (Bauman, 2000). 
 
The fall of state-controlled governance  
In many parts of SSA the described system of state-controlled governance in agricultural 
supply chains collapsed during economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Processes of 
privatization and liberalization were to remove the state control in agricultural commodity 
chains, provide competition and ensure efficiency. In most countries, the monopoly status of 
government marketing boards and parastatal processing unities fell down and private traders 
were allowed in agricultural trade. Many government marketing boards, cooperatives and 
(para-)state processing units either collapsed, were privatized or transformed. For example in 
Ethiopia, the parastatal company Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) which strictly 
controlled grain trade was transformed into the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise, a 
government buffer stock scheme. Also in Malawi, the official monopoly of the state agency 
Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali (OPAM) collapsed and its role was reduced to 
managing a strategic food reserve, distributing food aid and sales of grain in remote areas. In 
Nigeria, the Nigerian Cocoa Board collapsed as well as the parastatals for oil, palm, rubber 
  8and peanuts. The coffee marketing boards in Uganda and Tanzania were transformed into the 
Ugandan Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) and the Tanzanian Coffee Board (TCB) 
with purely regulatory functions. The Ghana Cotton Development Board was privatized into 
the Ghana Cotton Company (Kherallah et al., 2002). 
Economic reforms have not been complete and in most SSA countries the government 
still involves in agricultural supply chains in a variety of ways: through parastatal companies 
and marketing boards or through minority shares in privatized food processing companies, 
through state-owned banks and government credit schemes, provision of extension services 
etc. However, in general, due to these economic reforms since the 1980s, there has been a 
shift away from state governance in agricultural supply chains towards other forms of 
governance – mainly market-based forms of governance involving private companies and 
interlinking markets. The degree to which this shift has occurred and the governance systems 
that have appeared are very commodity specific and are discussed in the next section.   
 
3.  A Comparative Perspective on Recent Commodity Chain Governance 
In this section we discuss the variation among commodities (and across countries) in the 
recent governance systems of agricultural supply chains. We consecutively discuss the staple 
food crop sector, traditional export crops and non-traditional export crops.  
 
Staple food crops 
State-controlled governance systems are still most prevalent in the supply chains of staple 
food crops. Government interventions such as price controls and trade restrictions have been 
abolished in most countries (except for government price control in Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe; and trade restrictions in Benin, Ghana, Madagascar and Tanzania). However, in 
most countries, governments marketing boards still exist. They continue to be main players in 
  9the grain markets of a number of countries. In Malawi for example, the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) remains dominant in the maize market 
despite closure of a number of buying centers. In Mali, parastatal rice milling companies are 
only slowly being privatized and remain active and influential.  In most SSA countries 
however, the importance of marketing boards and parastatal processing companies in the 
staple food supply chains has decreased and privatised trading systems have emerged. 
Liberalisation reforms have prompted large numbers of small informal traders to enter into 
grain trade in most SSA countries. For example, it was estimated by Negassa and Jayne 
(1997) that the Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise – created form the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation – accounts for less than 5% of the cereals marketed by peasants. In Benin only 
0.15% of the traded volume maize is controlled by the Office National d’Appui à la Sécurité 
Alimentaire (ONASA) – created from the parastatal Office National des Céréales (ONA). 
Also in Ghana, small independent traders dominate the grain market. In Malawi where 
ADMARC is still dominant in the maize market, small private traders are active but engage 
mainly in bulking for ADMARC.   
The private traders that have merged in the staple food sector generally have limited 
capacity to innovate, poor access to credit and other resources, and limited storage capacity 
(Coulter and Poulton, 2001) and tend to rely on social and ethnic-based networks (Fafchamps 
and Minten, 2001). Private grain traders rely on simple spot market transactions to trade 
produce. In fact, the private sector operations are characterized by limited capital, a low 
degree of specialisation, and the absence of long-term investment, including in interlinking 
market relations. Private sector interlinking is largely absent and the government is still an 
important source of input and extension provision in many countries. For example, in Malawi 
ADMARC still distributes 61% of the fertilizer used by small farmers (Minot et al., 2000). 
Also in Zambia, still over half of the fertilizer is supplied by the Food Reserve Agency at 
  10pan-territorial prices (Jayne et al., 2003). The governance system of grain markets in SSA is 
characterized by a combination of the remainders of state governance and private simple 
market governance without interlinking.  
The effect of all this on the performance of the staple food crop sector depends in 
large part on the extent of the changes. In many SSA countries marketing margins in the 
staple food crop sector remain high (e.g. in Tanzania and Ethiopia). In addition, growth in per 
capita staple food crop production has been modest in most countries and negative in some 
countries (e.g. in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and the Gambia). Moreover, the use of inputs such as 
fertilizers and improved seeds declined in some regions (Kherralah et al., 2002).  
 
Traditional export crops 
During colonial periods, cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, tobacco and tea were 
mainly grown by smallholders in West Africa and on large industrial estate farms (owned by 
western settlers) in East and Southern Africa. After independence however, smallholder cash 
crop production expanded under state-controlled governance systems and outgrower 
schemes. Delgado (1995) estimated since the 1970s at least 90% of traditional export crop 
production in SSA is carried out by smallholders.  
In the past 15 years, there has been a remarkable shift from state governance in the 
supply chains towards private governance systems organized around private trading and 
processing companies. The removal of the monopoly status of (para)-state processing 
companies and government marketing boards, has in most countries and for most 
commodities resulted in an inflow of private capital into export crop processing and 
marketing. For example, in Tanzania and Uganda the collapse of the coffee marketing boards 
resulted in private investment in coffee marketing. By 1997, about 75% of coffee trade, 
including the best qualities, in Tanzania was handled by private traders. Also in the cashew 
  11nut sector, trade liberalization and the collapse of state owned processing companies, caused 
an inflow of private traders (mostly selling raw nuts directly into export markets). In 
Tanzania, private traders accounted for more than 90% of cashew nut trade in 1997 while the 
12 state-owned processing factories were completely abandoned. The privatization of the 
Ghana Cotton Development Board into the Ghana Cotton Company and liberalization in the 
cotton sector has caused private companies to invest in the sector resulting in increased 
competition (Poulton, 1998). Also in Tanzania, the majority of cotton (60%) is processed by 
private cotton gins (Kherallah et al., 2002).  
As a result of privatization and market liberalization, state-controlled governance of 
export crop supply chains gradually reduced and ceased to exist. Instead, supply chains 
developed around private companies such as traders, exporters and processors. The private 
forms of governance often involve interlinking markets. E.g. increased competition in the 
Ghana cotton sector has induced private companies to increase their services to farmers, 
including timely plowing services, reliable fertilizer and pesticide supplies, prompt payment 
after harvest and even plowing for farmers’ food crops (Poulton, 1998). Sometimes, multi-
partite arrangements with government institutions appear. For example, in the coffee sector in 
Tanzania, the private interlinked market governance involves arrangements with a state 
cooperative bank. In some sectors state governed and private governed supply chains co-exist 
(e.g. cotton in Tanzania) but they usually operate in different regions of a country.  
While for most crops and in most countries state-controlled export crop marketing and 
processing is making away for private market-based government, this is not the case for 
cotton in some West African countries, where parastatal companies remain active, handle the 
majority of the crop and govern the supply chains. In Mali the Compagnie Malienne pour le 
Développement du Textile (CMDT) has preserved its monopoly status in cotton processing 
  12and marketing, and remains the sole provider of seeds, chemicals, fertilizer, extension 
services.   
The shift away from government intervention and state-control over export crop 
supply chains has had major implications. First, it is reported that in the period after the 
reforms, the production and sale of African traditional exports grew by 30% in volume in the 
period 1990-1997 (Townsend, 1999). Second, market liberalization and the shift in 
governance system has improved the availability and the access to inputs and credits 
(Kherallah et al., 2002). Third, there have been major changes in the distribution of surpluses. 
Real producer prices for traditional African export crops increased substantially. For 
example, producer prices for coffee increased with 9.8 % annually in Cameroon and 14.1 % 
in Senegal in the period 1990-1997. In the same period, real producer prices for cotton 
increased with 5.9 % in Tanzania. However sectors where the shift away from state-governed 
supply chains has not yet occurred are worse off. E.g. the annual increase in cotton producer 
prices was only 2% in Benin and 0.8% in Mali (countries were the cotton sector remains to be 
state-controlled). Marketing margins for export crops have decreased while the producer’s 
share of the price has increased. For example, producer’s share have increased to more than 
70% in the coffee and cocoa sector in Cameroon, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. Producer’s 
share remains relatively low for cotton in Benin (37%) and Mali (44%).       
 
Non-traditional export crops  
The expansion of a non-traditional export sector is a recent phenomenon. Since the 1980s, 
the structure of developing country agricultural exports has changed significantly with non-
traditional export crops increasing sharply in importance (Figure 1). These non-traditional 
export crops are typically high-value commodities such as (fresh and processed) fruits and 
vegetables, and fish and seafood products. These products now account for more than 40% of 
  13total agricultural exports from developing countries while their share was only 21% in 1980
8. 
In SSA, these non-traditional exports are important in a number of countries: e.g. in Kenya, 
Senegal, Madagascar, South-Africa, and Ethiopia.  
Non-traditional export supply chains are completely controlled by private companies. 
Since these supply chains developed only recently – mainly after 1980 when many 
liberalisation and privatisation reforms had already been implemented – state involvement in 
these sectors have been much less than for traditional exports. Contrarily to the traditional 
export crop sector, also large supermarket chains - spread throughout industrial countries and 
large parts of the developing world, and starting to appear in SSA – play an important role in 
the supply chains of high-value commodities. In addition the degree of vertical coordination 
and the occurrence of  interlinking is very high in the supply chains of non-traditional 
exports. For example, in Senegal, extensive forms of market interlinking are observed in the 
export vegetable sector (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006). Exporting companies provide peasant 
farmers with inputs, credit, and extension and management services in return for timely and 
high quality supplies of French beans. Also in Madagascar, a private company provides 
inputs and extension services to 10,000 small horticulture farmers under contractual 
arrangements (Minten et al., 2006).  
The development of non-traditional export sectors in some SSA countries has had 
major positive welfare implications. Although some authors argue that the poorest and 
smallest farmers are excluded from these privately governed supply chains (e.g. Reardon et 
                                                 
8 A number of factors contribute in explaining the increase in non-traditional high-value exports. First, trade and 
investment liberalization and the change towards export oriented trade policies have played a role in stimulating 
developing countries to exploit their comparative advantages in the agri-food sector and encouraging non-
traditional high-value exports. Second, market conditions have also played a role in the shift to nontraditional 
exports. Traditional tropical products such as coffee, cocoa and tea became less attractive because of persistent 
volatility and long-term downward trends in world market prices for these products (Gulati et al, 2005). Third, 
the increase in nontraditional exports is induced by changing preferences of consumers in high- income 
countries stemming from health awareness, increasing income levels, and an increased demand for convenience 
prepared food (Diop and Jaffee, 2005). Moreover, consumer interest in product variety and year-round 
availability of fresh food has stimulated nontraditional exports from developing countries. 
 
  14al., 2003) in general farmers are receiving high prices for high-quality products which 
importantly contribute to rural incomes (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006; Minten et al., 2006).  
 
Summary  
There are important variations in supply chain governance among commodity types, as 
summarized in table 1. First, supply systems for staple food crops are governed through the 
remainders of state-controlled governance or through simple market-based governance – or, 
in most cases, a combination of both. Second, for traditional exported commodities there was 
a shift from state governance to private market-based governance, often with interlinking 
markets. Third, high-value non-traditional exports have grown over the past 20 years, based 
on private governance systems with interlinking markets.    
In the next sections we will show that the difference in product value (and other 
characteristics such as the perishability of the products) is key in explaining the observed 
differences in supply chain governance. Moreover, these differences in governance system 
are crucial in determining how much surpluses are created and how they are distributed along 
the value chain.    
 
4.   Conceptual Model 
In this section, we present a conceptual model to explain the observed differences in 
commodity chain governance, in particular the (lack of) emergence of interlinking and the 
distribution of the created surplus along the value chain.   
Consider the situation where a local household or farming company – which we refer 
to as “the farmer” – can sell farm products to a trader or a company – which we refer to as 
“the processor”. This processor sells the product (after transporting, processing, retailing, 
etc) to consumers – either domestically or internationally.  Let θ represent the value that is 
  15created by this transaction, net of the “processing” costs.  Hence, θ  is the value to be 
distributed between the processor and the farmer, taking into account the farmers production 
costs.   
The production of commodities for the market requires some (specific) input use (e.g. 
fertilizers, credit, seeds, technology). Assume that to produce one unit of output, the farmer 
requires specific inputs with a value of I on top of his standard production cost for 
subsistence production (e.g. labour, land). We assume that these specific inputs are not 
available to the farmer because of factor market imperfections. This assumption reflects the 
situation in many developing countries where local producers and households face important 
factor market constraints. These constraints hurt both farmers and processors: they prevent 
farmers from producing for the market and constrain access to raw materials for the 
processing firm.  
If the processing firm has access to the required inputs, the processor can act as an 
intermediary in the input market and provide (sell or lend) the inputs to the farmer. This, 
again, is a realistic case since the processor may have better collateral, more cash flow or face 
lower transport or transaction costs in accessing the inputs. If so, the processor will consider 
offering a contract to the farmer, which includes the provision of inputs and the conditions 
(time, amount and price) for purchasing the farmer’s product. We assume that the processor 
provides the farmer with the full amount of required inputs I per unit of production, or the 
processor does not provide any inputs
9.  
Note that in such a contract, each agent can hold-up the other agent. On the one hand, 
the farmer can divert the inputs to other uses, such as selling them or applying them to other 
production activities; or he may apply the inputs as agreed but then sell the output to 
competing buyers for a higher price. On the other hand, the buyer may pay a lower price to 
                                                 
9 Implying that the application of any amount of inputs below the optimal amount of inputs I is resulting in a 
lack of marketable surplus. 
  16the farmer than was originally agreed on, or simply postpone payment – a common practice 
in reality (Swinnen, 2007; Kydd and Dorward 2004, Poulton et al. 2006). 
  In the rest of this section we will show graphically and discuss under which 
conditions a contract is agreed upon and enforced (implying the creation of surplus) and the 
distribution of the contract surplus (A formal analysis is in Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007)).  
The participation constraints of the farmer and the processor and their incentive compatibility 
constraints play a crucial role here.   
 
Perfect enforcement 
To establish a baseline result, we start with assuming perfect (and costless) contract 
enforcement. Hence, if there exists a contract that satisfies both the farmer and the 
processor’s participation constraints, it will be realized. The participation constraints state 
that the contract should yield a higher payoff for both agents than the disagreement outcome, 
where the farmer and the processor do not trade at all.  
As enforcement is guaranteed, there is no risk of opportunistic behavior by any of the 
contract parties. In this case, we assume that the contract surplus is shared equally among 
both agents
10. The contract surplus S is defined as the surplus created by the contract over the 
sum of the initial outside options of the contracting agents: it is the value θ minus the extra 
production cost I due to the specific inputs. Whereas ΔY denotes the share of the surplus 
accruing to the farmer, ΔП is the processor’s share. Note that an agent’s outside option is 
crucial in determining his/her payoff. The total payoff is formed by adding each agent’s 
outside option to his share of S. 
For  θ < I, the quality premium is insufficient to justify the specific inputs cost. 
Contract formation would be inefficient here.  This is what we call efficient separation. For 
                                                 
10 This “equal split” assumption was first suggested by Nash (1953) and later widely adopted by other game 
theorists (e.g. Diamond & Maskin, 1979; Osborne & Rubinstein (1990), Muthoo (1999) etc.   
  17any value of θ ≥ I, contract formation is efficient, and surplus is always created in the case of 
perfect and costless enforcement.  
 
Costly enforcement 
When enforcement is costly, it is no longer certain that contracts will be honored. 
Opportunistic behavior may emerge. Hold-ups occur if one of the agents has an attractive 
alternative to contract compliance.  First, we discuss the case where the farmer has the 
opportunity to hold up the processor. In the next section, we also take into account the case 
where the processor has an opportunity to hold up the farmer. To understand under which 
conditions contracting will be sustainable and what the impacts are on the total surplus and 
on its distribution, we will start by considering the extreme situation where there are no 
external enforcement institutions – which is equivalent to assuming that external enforcement 
is prohibitively costly. 
 
One-sided holdup 
Assume only the farmer can potentially hold up the processor, namely by diverting the 
received inputs to other uses, such as selling them, or applying them to other production 
activities (e.g. subsistence food crops); or by applying the inputs but then selling the high-
quality output to a competing processor at a higher price. Indeed, if a competing processor 
values the high-quality product as much as the contracted processor does, the former can still 
earn more profits on it, as she has not paid for the specific inputs required for producing it.  
The farmer’s incentive compatibility constraint captures the necessary condition for the 
farmer to voluntarily comply with the contract. It states that the farmer’s income from the 
contract must at least be as much as his outside option, obtained from breaching the contract 
and selling elsewhere. Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) show how this is equivalent to the 
  18concept of efficiency wages (Salop 1979), whereas the employer pays a higher wage to his 
employees to minimize their incentive to quit and seek a job elsewhere, and define the 
difference between the producer price under costless enforcement and under prohibitively 
costly enforcement as an “efficiency premium”. The higher the specific inputs cost I is, or the 
higher the price is that competing buyers offer for the farmer’s produce on the local market, 
the higher this efficiency premium must be.  
Figure 2 shows how efficient separation occurs for θ<I, where the extra value created 
by the contract is too small to justify the specific inputs cost. However, for I< θ<2I, contracts 
break down although they could be profitable for both agents:  inefficient separation occurs. 
The reason is that for I<θ<3I, the farmer has an outside option that is more attractive than 
what he would get under an equal division of the contract surplus S. Indeed, if he would resell 
the received inputs (instead of using them), he can earn an amount I on top of his 
disagreement payoff. So this is what the processor should ultimately offer the buyer under the 
contract as well, by means of an efficiency premium on top of his usual surplus share. 
Otherwise, the farmer’s ICC is not satisfied. This obviously requires that S  ≥ I , for the 
processor’s PC to remain satisfied at the same time. If I<θ<2I, then 0<S<I, and there is no 
division of S that allows for simultaneous satisfaction of the farmer’s ICC and the processor’s 
PC. Inefficient separation occurs. For 2I<θ<3I, the processor is able to pay the farmer an 
efficiency premium that covers the difference between his equal division outcome and his 
outside option. The rest of the surplus will then accrue to the processor. Due to this efficiency 
premium, opportunistic behavior by the farmer is ruled out, and contracting is sustainable.  
Hence, over the interval 2I<θ<3I, the surplus going to the farmer is constant at ΔY=I. 
Notice that without efficiency premium, ΔY would range from 0.5I to I. The share going to 
the processor increases from 0 to I over this interval. 
  19So far, we ignored reputation costs. However, if he breaks a contract, the supplier may 
suffer a loss in terms of reputation, or social capital, or opportunities for future trade. We 
denote this reputation loss by φ
s. φ
s may for example be larger if buyers intensively share 
information on defaulters (e.g. Fafchamps & Minten, 1999). It puts a brake on opportunistic 
behavior, as the outside options for contract breach are reduced by an amount φ
s. In this case, 
the inefficient separation interval narrows
11 and the efficiency premium decreases. Note that 
farmers can benefit from weak contract enforcement institutions, through the efficiency 
premium, but may lose from inefficient separation.  
The actual outcome depends on several factors. In general, the implications for 
surplus sharing are as follows: farmers will receive a higher income when, ceteris paribus, (a) 
the value in the chain (θ) is higher, (b) their opportunity costs (of signing the contract as well 
as of honouring the contract once it has been signed) are higher and (c) when their reputation 
cost is lower.  
Finally, another way to enforce contracts is by engaging third party enforcement, if it 
is not prohibitively costly. Less inefficient separation will then occur, but the total contract 
surplus will be reduced. Define M as the cost of hiring a third party. Then the surplus is 





                                                 
11 The inefficient separation interval narrows as the condition for contract feasibility becomes S ≥ I - φ
s instead 
of  S ≥ I, hence the condition on S becomes weaker. 
12 Examples of third party enforcement are paying for mafia protection, or for supervision. Alternatively, when 
the most probable destination of delivered inputs is the non-contract, subsistence crops, input diversion 
incentives may be overcome by offering farmers additional inputs as fertilizers and pesticides for their own food 
crops (e.g. Govereh et al. 1999) 
  20Apart from the farmer, the processor could as well behave opportunistically, by paying a 
lower price to the farmer than was originally agreed on, or by postponing payment, as is 
observed in reality (Swinnen, 2007, Kydd and Dorward 2004, Poulton et al. 2006). 
If the processor behaves opportunistically, she can appropriate the contract surplus up 
to the farmer’s outside option at that moment, minus her own reputation loss (φ
p) from 
breaching the contract. She is more likely to do this if her reputation costs are low and the 
alternative sales options for the farmer are poor (compared to the value to the processor). 
Obviously, the supplier will foresee that the processor can act in such way. If the ex-post 
renegotiated price is lower than the payoff he can gain through input diversion, he will be 
first to breach the contract.  
More general, with opportunistic behavior by the processor, not all contract 
conditions are credible and the surplus distribution is constrained. This is illustrated in Figure 
3 for φ
s=0 (the reputation cost of the farmer) and φ
p=3I/2 (the reputation cost of the 
processor). The maximum surplus share that a farmer can expect to receive equals the 
reputation cost of the processor.
13
Notice that what is going on in this case is that (the equivalent of) a negative 
efficiency premium is paid by the farmer to the processor in high value chains to make the 
contract sustainable. 
This model leads us to conclude that opportunistic behavior affects (a) the frequency 
of inefficient separation and (b) the division rule for surplus sharing. First, when enforcement 
gets costly, and reputation costs are low, inefficient separation appears. If the value in the 
chain (θ) is sufficiently high, this can be overcome by paying an efficiency premium (either 
positive or negative). For lower values of θ, this is beneficial to the farmer. For very high 
values of θ, this benefits the processor. This is intuitive, as the risk for hold-up behavior by 
                                                 
13 Now, remember that the minimum surplus share that is required to prevent the farmer from input diversion 
equals I-φ
s. Hence, if φ
s=φ
p=0, inefficient separation will occur over the whole domain of θ. 
  21the farmer is particularly high in low value chains, whereas the risk for hold-up behavior by 
the processor is high for high values chains. 
But inefficient separation will still occur (a) if the value θ is low, (b) if reputation 
costs (φ
s  and  φ
p) are low and/or contract enforcement is difficult (costly), and (c) if 
alternative sales outlets are plenty. 
 
Impact of Competition 
If other buyers of high-value products enter the market, the contracted buyer will experience 
competition. First, she will experience competition ex ante, while negotiating with her 
supplier; this will clearly raise the ex ante outside option of the supplier.  The supplier’s 
outside option will be higher, the higher the fixed cost of the buyer to search an alternative 
supplier, the lower the supplier’s cost of searching an alternative buyer, and the lower the 
supply:demand ratio is. 
  Second, the buyer will experience competition ex post, when other buyers try to lure 
away suppliers already under contract. These other buyers may be able to offer higher prices 
to the suppliers in the case buyer specificity (1/γ) of the high-value products is not 
inhibitively high. Indeed, they do not need to charge a price discount for the inputs received 
on credit. The supplier’s ex post outside option will be particularly tempting in the case I is 
high, γ is high, and φ
s is low. In such a case, to prevent her supplier from breaching the 
contract, the buyer will again need to offer him an efficiency premium. The higher this 
efficiency premium is, the wider the interval of θ is where inefficient separation occurs. In 
general, competition between buyers affects contract formation and rent distribution in the 
following ways:  
First, ex ante competition increases the share of the total output value accruing to the 
supplier by increasing his ex ante outside option. The value of this outside option depends on 
  22the respective transaction costs that the buyer and supplier face in switching contract partners, 
and the probability each has to find a new contract partner (i.e. the buyer: supplier ratio). 
  Second, ex post competition increases the share of the total output value accruing to 
the supplier by increasing the efficiency premium that a buyer needs to pay her supplier in 
order to secure their contract. This efficiency premium is contingent on the value of the 
advanced inputs, the reputation cost of the supplier, and the buyer specificity of the high 
value product. However, the higher this efficiency premium is, the higher the probability also 
is that the output value will not suffice to satisfy both the supplier’s incentive compatibility 
constraint and the buyer’s participation constraint. If it does not suffice, inefficient separation 
follows. 




p on the quality premium θ in itself, which we had earlier considered to be exogenous to 
the model.  
Indeed, the number of agents operating in the market is expected to negatively affect 
the penalty for contract breach (cfr. Hoff & Stiglitz, 1998), first because the threat of cut-off 
from future contract arrangements is less stringent, as there are other contract partners 
available. This argument is in line with Eswaran & Kotwal (1985), who state that reputation 
is an effective weapon against moral hazard only for suppliers “of those factors that are in 
excess supply”. With other words, a higher demand for the supplier’s produce lowers his 
reputation cost from breaching a contract. 
  A second reason why the penalty for breaching a contractis lower with more 
competition, is that reputation effects are less prevalent in a competitive market, where agents 
are less likely to coordinate and share information (see also Zanardi 2004). This will make it 
easier for an opportunistic supplier to find an alternative buyer.  Local information networks 
work less well when the number of agents expands, as it costs more effort, money, and/or 
  23time to let information spread among a larger group of agents. This is easy to see by thinking 
of the case where sending a message is costly. The more agents there are in the market, the 
more messages need to be sent around, hence the more expensive it becomes to share 
information among agents. 
Then, the quality premium θ may also be affected: if more competing processors enter the 
market to seize a part of the rents, consumer market changes may no longer be neglected. As 
the supply of high-quality products to final consumers increases, the quality premium, and 
hence the contract surplus, will go down. This will lead to decreased incomes for both the 
supplier and the buyer. 
 
  245.   Implications for Commodity Chain Governance and Surplus Distribution  
We now apply our theoretical model to provide some hypotheses why, after the agricultural 
reforms in Southern and Eastern Africa, linkages between input delivery, farm finance, and 
crop sale have been established for some types of commodities, but not for others. Crucial in 
this debate is the value of a specific commodity, the structure of the industry (e.g. 
competition) (see Figure 4), and other commodity characteristics such as perishability (see 
Figure 5).  
We follow Poulton et al. (2006) in distinguishing between three sub-sectors: staple 
food crops (e.g. maize, rice, wheat, sorghum and millet), traditional export commodities (e.g. 
cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco), and non-traditional agricultural export crops (e.g. 
fruits and vegetables, cut flowers, livestock, and fish).  
 
Staple food crops 
The value in staple food chains is typically low as a quality premium for staple food crops is 
typically small or non-existent. First of all, staple foods are often not traded and quality 
standards at the home market are typically low. In this market, low-quality and unprocessed 
grains easily substitute for higher quality processed products, as processing can be done at 
home. 
Second, staples for the home market and those that can be traded may both face strong 
competition from the world markets where cheap grains are available, either from 
industrialized countries (often subsidized) or from developing countries producing at a very 
low cost (e.g. Brazil).  
Third, contract enforcement is quite difficult and hence costly, due to the high number 
of potential buyers operating in the market. Indeed, many households themselves are 
involved in staple food marketing, in addition to many, often small, traders (Govereh et al. 
  251999). Jones (1972) already described the African staple food markets as “chaotic” and 
displaying a “basic lack of organization”.  
Related to this, staples such as grains are relatively easily to store for a while, 
relatively easy to transport with minimal investments, both enhancing the likelihood of 
opportunistic sales. 
In combination these factors make that accessing inputs and creating surplus is 
difficult in these staple food chains as the opportunistic sales are relatively easy and the value 
is too low to sustain interlinked contracts through self-enforcement. 
Contract enforcement is only possible when there is external enforcement, such as a 
state regulated marketing channel.  
 
Traditional export commodities 
For traditional export commodities, θ is of an intermediate level. Returns to producing export 
commodities are typically higher than returns from staple food crop or subsistence farming.  
Moreover, these export commodities are often processed industrially; households are 
therefore less likely to be potential buyers for high-quality produce. This makes contracts 
easier to supervise. On the other hand, farmers still have more opportunities to find 
alternative buyers for crops such as cotton and coffee etc which are more easily storable than 
very perishable crops, such as vegetables.  
The likelihood of sustained contracting depends on the structure of the market and 
(fluctuations in) the demand for the commodity.  Contract failure may result where there are 
many buyers, strongly competing with each other, and in commodities which are relatively 
easy to store and to transport. In other cases, contracting may turn out to be perfectly viable. 
 
Non-traditional export crops 
  26In the case of non-traditional export crops, θ is high. By using specific inputs, international 
standards can be achieved, such that the resulting fruits, vegetables and cut flowers can be 
exported to industrialized countries, where the consumer is prepared to pay relatively high 
prices for e.g. hand-picked beans from Kenya or roses from Zambia. These are very labor-
intensive crops, while local wages are very low. The returns are typically much higher than 
for subsistence food crops or other alternatives. 
Contract enforcement is easier here because first, if households are potential 
consumers of these products, they are probably not prepared to pay very high prices. What 
we do observe, is that local households often consume the rejected products. In Guatemala, 
for example, Glover and Kusterer (1990) mention that rejected cauliflower and broccoli are 
widely and cheaply available and have become a nutritious staple of the poorest people. 
Leaves and stalks can be used as animal feed or organic fertilizer for food crops. Secondly, 
contract enforcement is also facilitated by the perishable nature of the products. Farmers 
simply do not have enough time to look out for profitable opportunities. 
Finally, as the non-traditional export commodities still concern a relatively small and 
new share of African exports, marketing channels have not had the time to develop 
extensively yet. Trade does not happen in bulk like for coffee and cocoa at commodity 
exchanges, but must happen quite fast and efficiently e.g. through pre-agreements with 
supermarkets or specialized trading companies. As a result, trade is mainly restricted to a few 
large export firms. They enjoy economies of scale in quality control and export transactions. 
As a result, there is usually only modest competition for high-quality products of this type. 
 
6. Policy Implications 
For the staple food crop sector in SSA to contribute to economic growth and poverty 
alleviation, it is crucial to realize surpluses in this sector and for those surpluses to be 
  27distributed equitably. We have shown theoretically that supply chain development with 
private governance and interlinking is crucial in this. Several policy options to assure such 
supply chain development to take place follow from our findings.  
First, supply chain governance is likely to develop if the value of staple food crops 
could be increased. However, in many SSA countries, poor households are both producers 
and consumers of staple food crops. As increasing staple food crop value unavoidably means 
increasing consumer prices, this may not be a valid policy option in these poor countries from 
a food security and poverty perspective. 
Second, our model shows that enforcement institutions are crucial for private 
governance systems with interlinking and equitable surplus distribution to emerge and be 
sustainable. Several authors (e.g. Dorward et al., 1998; Poulton et al., 2006) recommend 
government interventions to directly support interlinking arrangements in the staple food 
crops sector by shaping the right institutional environment. However, the development of a 
good institutional environment with strong contract enforcement mechanisms might be very 
costly in the case of staple food crops. A large number of buyers in the sector (and hence a 
high degree of competition) might complicate contract enforcement. Moreover, such 
institutional development might be particularly hard in remote areas where many staple food 
crops are produced. Therefore costly policies specifically targeted at improving the contract 
enforcement environment should be carefully deliberated against more general policy 
priorities, addressing the fundamental problem of factor market constraints.  
In fact, attention to the imperfections in input markets is probably the most broad 
policy option that follows from our findings. If imperfections in input markets could be 
handled, supply chains for staple foods crops could more easily develop without the need for 
interlinked contracts. Specific policy recommendations include the implementation of rural 
  28credit schemes, attention to input markets, the development of extension services, the 
improvement of rural transport and infrastructure, etc.   
An important consideration in this discussion is that there might be spillover effects 
from contract enforcement and the development of sustainable private interlinking in the cash 
crop sector – which is less costly mainly due to a higher value in this sector. These spillover 
effects might be direct or indirect. Households engaging in cash crop production through 
interlinked contract have better access to inputs, credit, extension, management advice, and 
cash earnings which might indirectly benefit their food crop productivity due to technology 
spillovers, better skills, and better access to cash. In some cases cash crop production under 
interlinked contracts directly benefit household’s food crops as the contracts provide specific 
inputs for food crops as part of the enforcement mechanisms. Hence, shaping the institutional 
environment for cash crop supply chain development might indirectly benefit the staple food 
crop sector.   
Finally, we need to mention one more general inference that follows directly from the 
analytical results and the empirical observations in this paper. Privatization and liberalization 
induces competition in agricultural markets and hence increases the likelihood of supply 
chain development with interlinking and equitable surplus distribution. In several SSA 
countries government interventions (and especially the lack of transparency and consistency 
thereof) impede private supply chains from developing, and are therefore a considerable 
constraint on the positive implications of these developments.  
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Table 1: Commodity types, value and supply chain governance  
Value of 
commodities 
Type of commodities  Type of governance system 
-   simple market governance 
Low value 
-   staple food crops traded 
in domestic markets  -   state governance with 
interlinking  Medium 
value 
-   traditional export 
commodities 
High value 
-   non-traditional export 
commodities 








































Figure 1: The structure of developing country agricultural exports, 1980 - 2000 
Source: Calculated from Aksoy (2005)  
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Figure 3: Surplus sharing under two-sided hold-ups 
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Figure 4: Commodity value, competition and the emergence of interlinking 
 
 
Figure 5: Commodity value and perishability and the emergence of interlinking 
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